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Agency Problems and Airport Security:
Quantitative and Qualitative Evidence on the Impact of
Security Training
Martina de Gramatica, Fabio Massacci, Woohyun Shim, Ug˘ur Turhan, and
Julian Williams
We analyze the issue of agency costs in aviation security by combining results from of a
quantitative economic model with a qualitative study based semi-structured interviews.
Our model extends previous Principal-Agent models by combining the traditional fixed
and varying monetary responses to physical and cognitive effort with non-monetary welfare
and potentially transferable value of employees’ own human capital. To provide empirical
evidence for the trade-offs identified in the quantitative model we have undertaken an
extensive interview process with regulators, airport managers, security personnel and those
tasked with training security personnel from an airport operating in a relatively high risk
state, Turkey. Our results indicate that the effectiveness of additional training depends on
the mix of ‘transferable skills’, and ‘emotional’ buy-in of the security agents. Principals
need to identify on which side of a critical tipping point their agents are to ensure that
additional training, with attached expectations of the burden of work, aligns the incentives
of employees with their own objectives.
KEY WORDS: Semi-structured interviews; principal–agent models; public policy; mixing
qualitative and quantitative analysis; security risk, human capital.
1. INTRODUCTION
Security officers are an essential component of
the mechanisms that secure airports across the world.
Since the first inter ministerial conference after 9/11,
the importance of their training has been stressed
in the revision of the International Civil Aviation
Organization’s Annex 17 (the “Aviation Security
Manual” that regulates airport security around the
world). Training security personnel is also expensive:
according to a study for the EU Commission, (24)
accounting for around 2% of indirect expenses for
airport security. A critical issue for a policy maker or
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security manager is to find an appropriate training
portfolio that results in a suitable level of security.
Unfortunately, empirical approaches based on the
statistical analysis of historical security incidents
may not work in this scenario as data is either limited
or does not capture some of the factors shaping
officers’ performance; for an eclectic set of examples
in this domain see Johnson. (25)
The methodological contribution of this paper
is to provide an approach to risk analysis when
empirical evidence is limited and controlled studies
are ethically impossible. Our proposal is to combine
a quantitative principal-agent (P–A) framework for
modeling the effective effort of security personnel
with a qualitative case study to validate the
outcomes suggested by the model. To illustrate
our approach, we have chosen an airport in the
Eskis¸ehir region of central Turkey, a zone with a
1 0272-4332//0100-0001$22.00/1 iC
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relatively high level of risk. The airport is run
by the organization entrusted by the Turkish Civil
Authority for nationwide security training of airport
security staff. Hence, we have been given an almost
unprecedented degree of access to airport security
stakeholders to conduct extensive interviews in situ.
A P–A framework is particularly well suited
for analyzing security in civil aviation because the
stated goal of security authorities entrusted with this
task is managing risk; however, the implementation
of policies at an operational level is performed by
staff who are usually paid at or below the national
average for their respective countries. For example,
the US governments Federal employee pay guide
at the “Office of Personnel Management”, http:
//www.opm.gov, shows that the Transport Security
Administration (TSA) main bands lie between 1
and 5, attaining a maximum step 10 pay of just
over $39,000 in 2014. The national median pay in
the United States in 2013 was $51,300. Interview
evidence from our Turkish stakeholders (see §(6)
indicates that the comparative level of wages,
relative to average national incomes, is not materially
different to that of the US and anecdotal evidence
suggests that may even be worse.
In this scenario, a misalignment between the
goal of the principal (the government authority) and
the goals of the agents (the security officers on the
ground) is a concrete risk to be faced6. Training
has been traditionally viewed as an appropriate
mechanism to increase the agent’s “intrinsic motiva-
tion” to achieve the principal’s goals when financial
incentives are absent or misaligned as illustrated
by Be´nabou and Tirole (7,8), Casadesus-Masanell (13)
and Murdock (32). Our quantitative model includes
the typical mechanism with fixed and incentive wage
rates and explicitly models the notion of intrinsic
motivation in the spirit of Be´nabou and Tirole (7)
where agents exhibit an emotional engagement
with the objectives of the principal. We add a
third component that captures an alternative quasi-
monetary reward: the ability to obtain certifiable
skills improving future employability. This notion
6Kip Hawley, in “Why airport security is broken and how to
fix it” (Wall Street Journal on April 15, 2012), illustrates
the problem of misalignment. UK’s setting of targets for
detections of water bottles and other contraband led to a
spike of ‘successful’ detection of water bottles, being relatively
‘low-hanging-fruit’ in comparison to other items, as a way to
achieve detection targets.
is similar to the classic concept of ‘forward looking
human capital’ in Becker (5) and Schultz (37).
To validate the model, we combine this quanti-
tative approach with a qualitative case-study based
on the classic methodological principles set out in
Yin (42) and conducted with the approach of Bloom
and Van Reenen (9) by using focused semi-structured
interviews with purposive sampling of stakeholders.
The interviews validate that the behavior predicted
by the model when training arrangements vary (e.g.
signs of derivatives or tipping points) is indeed
what is experienced by stakeholders with relevant
experience on the field.
A limitation of our approach is that we do not
make point predictions; however, it does allow the
risk analyst to disentangle the myriad of explanations
suggested by subject-matter experts on the relative
effectiveness of security training in the field. An
appropriate training portfolio can then be designed.
The remainder of this paper is organized as
follows: §(2) provides details on the geo-political
and institutional arrangements for airport security
provision in Turkey and some background on our
specific airport and its unique importance to Turkish
aviation security. In §(4) we present a series of simple
P–A models that are specifically attuned to the
aviation security setting and outline the important
trade-offs that factor into the creation of explicit
and implicit incentive compatible contracts. §(5)
carefully outlines the objectives, methodology and
setting for our semi-structured interviews and §(6)
then proceeds to integrate the results from these
interviews with the results of the theoretical model to
illustrate the agency problems and the nature of the
trade-offs facing the policy maker. Finally, in §(7) we
provide some commentary on the complementarity
of this type of approach and frequentist empirical
analysis and some final general concluding remarks
and opportunities for future research.
2. AIRPORT SECURITY IN TURKEY
Turkish citizens and visitors have been the
victims of several terrorist related activities and the
need to protect citizens and visitors using airports is
a pressing need for public policy-makers in Turkey.
Table I displays selected examples of terrorist or
similar incidents in Turkish airports from 2001 to
2013. Whilst none has caused mass casualty, several
came close to near mass casualty events.
At the time of writing (2014), Turkey has been in
membership negotiations with the European Union
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Table I . Selected Terrorist or Similar Incidents in Turkish Airports from 2001 to 2013.
Year Type of Incidents Description
2001 Hijack attempt Unukova Airlines Istanbul-Moskow flight. It was hijacked by three Chechen terrorists. Flight
diverted to Medine, UAE. Three people died in the police operation including one terrorist.
2003 Hijack attempt Turkish Airlines Malatya-Ankara-Istanbul flight. Hijacker took two cabin crew hostage and
released a manifesto and wanted to go Moscow. No injury or dead.
2004 Bomb attack Turkish Airlines Izmir-Istanbul flight. After the flight landed and passengers had embarked,
an object was found by cleaning staff exploded. Three people were injured.
2006 Arson Fire at the cargo area in Istanbul Ataturk airport. Three people were injured and millions of
dollars in damage were caused. The Kurdistan Freedom Hawks claimed responsibility.
2007 Hijack attempt Pegasus Airlines Diyarbakir-Istanbul flight hijacked by a hijacker with a bomb threat. Pilot
landed the airplane to the Ankara Esenboga airport.
2009 Hijack attempt Egyptair Istanbul-Cairo flight. The would be hijacker used a false passport.
2012 Bomb attack Explosive device placed at Diyarbakir airport. It defused before explosion.
2013 Cyber attack Custom systems of Istanbul Ataturk and Sabiha Gokcen airports were blocked for a while and
flights delayed.
Note: Source: ITERATE database and own investigation. The examples listed in the table do not distinguish whether the attempts
were successful. They were used to show how security incidents might cause mass casualty and property damage.
(EU). As part of the accession, the variation in
policy approaches to security between Turkey and
the EU has required particular attention in regard
to conforming with the Acquis Communitaire and
other elements of EU constitutional law. In §(6)
this topic is intertwined with the operation policy
considerations and some commentary is provided.
The Directorate General of Civil Aviation
(DGCA) is the Turkish government agency respon-
sible for aviation security. It has a dedicated unit
responsible for training, education, research and
inspection specifically relating to airport terminal,
airside and ground security. In the sequel, we refer
to aviation security as the set of all security issues
relating to air transport and ‘airport security’ as
the subset of aviation security relating specifically to
terminal, airside and ground security of passengers
and planes.
The DGCA is staffed by personnel from various
national government agencies and the state police.
The DGCA is one of the main providers of security
training programs for airport security staff via one of
the Turkish Universities (Anadolu University), who
are not normally government employees, in contrast
to, for instance, the US Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) who are federal employees.
A key focus of our analysis will be the impact of
training as this forms a very significant component
of the overall security budget. In terms of contractual
liability for security incidents, the arrangements are
complex, only partially documented and often legally
untested. This is discussed, albeit anecdotally, in
some detail in §§(6.2).
The International Civil Aviation Organization
(ICAO), an agency of the United Nations, codifies
the general principles and techniques used in aviation
and provides much of the security requirements for
civil air transport (Annex 17). The International Air
Transport Association (IATA), a trade organization,
implements and delivers the training courses needed
to meet those requirements on behalf of ICAO.
As the national civil aviation body, the DGCA is
responsible for the local implementation assuring
that Turkish airports are compliant with the various
international requirements set down by IATA and
ICAO, and that needs of the local security conditions
are appropriately covered.
Therefore, there is a strong correspondence
between DGCA training courses and IATA and
ICAO training requirements (and their own training
courses). For instance, “Module 16: Hazardous
Substances” of the DGCA training requirements is
primarily driven by IATA and ICAO requirements in
this area. Another example, the IATA course entitled
“Unruly Passenger Prevention and Response” and
DGCA “Module 8: Dealing with Potentially Disrup-
tive Passengers” cover essentially identical topics.
The DGCA requirements add several local details
specific to Turkey, such as additional details on the
determination of offensive acts specific to the Turkish
legal system.
The types of training undertaken by security
agents can be broadly classified into two areas, we
denote these ‘general security training’ and ‘technical
specific security training’. General security training
covers all aspects of security and a large component
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of the training is aimed at ensuring that the agents
have a clear understanding of threats, objectives, and
tools of the DGCA. Technical specific security train-
ing focuses on role specific aspects such as proper
operation of x-ray machines, firearms training and
identification of suspects from behavioral patterns.
A key difference between general security training
and technical specific security training is the element
of in situ effort required to successfully complete
the courses. In general, either directly or indirectly,
technical specific security training requires the agent
to engage in additional effort within their working
domain to ensure that the requirements of the course
are successfully met, and is usually concluded by
a certificate of performance; in contrast, general
security training is primarily a classroom or on-line
exercise, and is typically concluded by a certificate of
attendance. In Table II we provide a short summary
of IATA and DGCA training modules to illustrate
the observed differences in general security training
versus technical specific security training.
Our interviews were conducted at Anadolu
airport in Eskis¸ehir and it is useful to provide some
context on why this airport is a useful case for
study. Anadolu airport is the DGCA main training
centre for airport security staff in Turkey. It is also
a training centre for Turkish air-traffic controllers
and provides training and accreditation for staff
across the airport domain in Turkey. Moreover, it
is a functioning airport operating within the town
of Eskis¸ehir in the region of Central Anatolia. The
airport itself is part of the University and provides
a practical test-centre for vocational courses on
all aspects of the operations of airports including
security, whilst actually operating as an airport itself.
The airport serves mainly as a hub for the
town for the university students resident there. It
is worth noting that the need for a reasonable sized
airport in Eskis¸ehir is due to the large number of
transient students that Anadolu University supports.
The university has around 23,000 students locally
resident and nearly two million undertaking distance
learning. The reason for this large number stems from
Anadolu University’s status as the primary national
distance learning centre in Turkey.
Over the course of their education students are
sometimes required on site and, with such a large
student population, the turnover of travelers makes
the airport of the University the 42nd busiest airport
in the second most populous state in Europe, with
50,000 passengers traveling through it in 2013.
Our case study interviews encompass stake-
holders from DGCA, staff trainers from Anadolu
University and private companies, and members of
the security staff from Anadolu Airport.
3. RELATED WORK
Our work aims at linking incentive issues in
airport security with an economic model. As with
other industry sectors, critical infrastructures such
as electricity, transportation and telecommunications
involve the multifaceted interactions among various
internal and external parties in the security environ-
ment.
One of the main issues is that the actions taken
by participating parties might not be easily observed
and monitored by those eventually accountable for
the performance of the infrastructure. This type of
problems has been commonly analyzed using P–A
explanations. According to Eisenhardt (17) P–A the-
ory provides valuable tools for studying situations in
which the information is asymmetrically distributed
among actors, such as the principal and collection of
agents, and the actor’s goals are in conflict with those
of others (i.e., misaligned incentives). The theory
therefore allows us to answer a question on how
the principal can design a contract and a system of
incentives (punishments and rewards) that make the
agent behave in the best interest of the principal.
If monitoring agents’ actions is costly, then it
is likely that the principal with have incomplete
information on the choice of actions by the agent.
As such, there maybe a moral-hazard element to the
agents action, when incentives are not fully aligned.
In some cases, the principal often makes a payment
to the agent based on the outcome after an action has
occurred, transferring liability to the agent, which in
some cases may impose an unfair cost sharing. In
contrast if the principal is forced to pay the agent
‘up-front’ then the opposite effect may occur. (17,31)
For example, in the context of information
security, Anderson et al. (1) argue that even when
there is more spending on information security, many
security breaches cannot be avoided as long as
moral hazard and adverse selection from misaligned
incentives exist. This phenomenon may occur when
the agent (i.e. an individual or organization) respon-
sible for the security of the system is not directly
exposed to a proportion of the losses resulting from
a security incident and when monitoring is costly
and is consequently incomplete. Without proper
liability sharing regimes, P–A problems will arise and
jeopardize security of systems in part or in whole.
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Table II . Examples of Civil Aviation Security Training Modules offered by IATA and DGCA. (15)
Category IATA DGCA Target groups
General
Security
Training
Aviation security awareness course; Aviation
security awareness course for the leadership &
Management training program; IATA Cargo
security awareness; Building a future air-
traffic-management (ATM) system; Effective
employee background vetting
Security awareness training; Airport se-
curity; Screening of staff, passengers &
cabin baggage; Airline business security;
Aircraft baggage & cargo security; Cargo
& mail security; Crisis management
All staff, all security
staff or staff in each
service area
Technical
Specific
Security
Training
Unruly Passenger Prevention & Response;
Predictive passenger screening; Passenger data
program; Airport security operations optimiza-
tion; Aviation cyber security; Aviation security
management; Customs security & facilitation;
Security audits & Quality control; Security X-
ray screening operations
Control of potentially dangerous pas-
sengers; Passenger interviews & travel
documents; Communication & body lan-
guage; Screening of air cargo; Hazardous
substances; Security management & lead-
ership; Flight baggage screening
Security staff in each
specific area
Note: Source: IATA Training Catalogue (39) and DGCA Training Manual. Whilst General Security Training generally awards no
certificate or only certificate of attendance, Technical Specific Security Training has a stricter rule (e.g., minimum marks) and
provides a certificate of performance to participants with a minimum or higher grade.
Our work also builds on the literature on
supply chain security with multiple agents. Atallah
et al. (2) utilize simulation based models to discuss
the incentive misalignments when developing secure
protocols collaboratively between supply chain part-
ners. Their results indicate that Pareto beneficial
collaborative action can only be conducted when the
private information of the partners is not collectively
disclosed. Bakshi and Kleindorfer (4) demonstrate
how a first-best outcome in supply chain security
with asymmetric information can be achieved,
when supply chain partners make some security
investment. They further illustrate that, even if the
retailer cannot observe the supplier’s action, ‘buy
out’ contracts can lead to a first-best outcome.
Subsequently, Bakshi and Gans (3) explore a game-
theoretic model that takes into account incentive
and security issues, and identified an optimal
security contract encompassing the U.S. Bureau of
Customs and Border Protection, the trading firms
and terrorists. In particular, they discuss moral
hazard issues in the context of port security, where
an important finding is that a properly designed
customs-trade partnership program can provide an
incentive for trading firms to join the partnership
program, and makes it possible to transfer some of
the government’s security burden to trading firms.
Our work is also related to the literature on
‘intrinsic motivation’ in behavioural economics and
psychology. For instance, Murdock (32) models the
agent’s incentive structure with intrinsic motivation
(an intrinsic incentive that has no direct effect
on the agent’s directly measurable rewards) and
argues that intrinsic incentives and implicit contracts
are complements. Be´nabou and Tirole (7) provide a
formal model to discuss how explicit incentives may
undermine the agents’ motivation in the long run
and how intrinsic motivation can improve the agents’
performance. Casadesus-Masanell (13) presents a P–
A framework taking into account only a fixed
payment, and shows how intrinsic motivation can
promote trust in the P–A relationship. Canton (12)
also examines the power of intrinsic motivation
particularly in public organizations, and identifies
cases where material incentives lead to crowding-in
or -out of intrinsic motivation.
4. THE MODEL
We initially present a standard model of agency,
along Holmstrom and Tirole. (22) We then adjust the
underlying assumptions of the model to include the
effects of intrinsic incentives and transferability of
human capital. The functional form that we utilize
to adjust the standard utility function is partly
based on the work of Casadesus-Masanell (13) and
Canton. (12) However, our treatment takes explicit
account of human capital and training following the
classic treatment of such issues in Schultz. (37)
While building on previous P–A literature
with intrinsic motivation, our model is particularly
attuned to the context of civil aviation security by
capturing the following features: different agents, dif-
ferent policy measures to address agency problems,
6 de Gramatica et al.
different types of security training, lack of robust
data for statistical analysis, and rich anecdotal
information.
4.1 The Benchmark Model
We focus on a P–A interaction where principal
and agent are both on the security provision side.
Games where attackers react to choices of the
principal and the agent are possible. Recent research
in this direction (27,35) have indicated that the only
effect of this inclusion is to magnify the issues that
we raise herein: the penalty for agency problems is
even greater than when attacking effort is exogenous.
The principal is a government agency represent-
ing the social planner (hereinafter, referred to as ‘the
government’) and the agent is a worker conducting
security on the principal’s behalf. As for the agent,
we therefore consider both police officers and security
staff (e.g., security guards and X-Ray screeners)
who work at an airport to meet the goals of the
government (hereinafter, we refer both of them as
‘the employee’). For the US case, the employment
relation is direct as TSA is a federal agency that
operates within airports. For European countries as
well as Turkey there is a mix of approaches. In many
cases the airport directly employs the security staff
and as such is an intermediary agent. Similarly to the
arguments regarding reactive attackers, adding layers
of agents amplify the underlying P–A problems. (33)
To model the interaction between government
and employee, we consider that the employee needs
to comply with various security rules to avoid any
penalty, but his action to comply with these rules is
costly to him: he is adverse to taking action. The
mechanism itself and its parameters, are designed
to be as simple as possible in order to focus on
behavioral issues. For reference, model parameters
and their intuition used throughout in the study are
summarized in Table III .
Let a be the employee’s action of compliance
with security rules, x be the observable informative
signal (i.e. outcome) from the action a, and  be an
exogenous shock. We have x = a + . For example,
we can think of a as the level of care the employee
takes for ensuring security and x as the airport
security level achieved by his effort (measured by the
magnitude of a). In our interviews the participants
refer to effort in terms of perceived motivation.
Mathematically, we compose effort and motivation as
functions of each other to follow the extant literature
on modeling behavior in economics.
Table III . Description of Model Parameters and Choices.
Principal’s decision
α Incentive wage rate.
β Fixed wage.
Agent’s choices and parameters
a Employee’s choice of effort.
r Employee’s level of risk aversion.
Welfare effect parameters
ρ Emotional satisfaction, feeling of responsibility.
δ Employee’s feeling of ‘burden’.
γ Marginal rate of transferability of effort to future
income.
Environmental parameters
σ2 The variance of the shock  and for convenience
we set k := rσ2 .
Following Holmstrom and Milgrom, (22) the re-
ward function is defined as s(x) = αx + β = α(a +
)+β after informative signal a+ has been realized.
This implies that the employee has to bear some
uncertainty associated with α.
The employee’s cost of action is considered to
be quadratic as suggested by Be´nabou and Tirole, (7)
c(a) = a2, and hence is a strictly convex function
with increasing marginal cost of action (i.e., c′(a) > 0
and c′′(a) > 0). The employee’s monetary rent from
carrying out a can be denoted as α(a+ ) + β − a2.
We assume that employees are prudent and risk
averse since it is hard for them to bear any short-term
financial losses with their limited resources (see §(6)
for an empirical confirmation of this assumption).
The corresponding constant absolute risk aversion
(CARA) utility function is captured by the following
functional form
ua = W − e−r(α(a+)+β−a2) (1)
where r is a coefficient of constant absolute risk
aversion and W is the current wealth level which is a
positive constant for our purposes. Hereinafter, the
subscript in ua is used to denote the agent.
The government would be naturally risk averse in
terms of global management of civil aviation security.
Yet, this would transfer into a multitude of risk
mitigation measures (security personnel, body scans,
X-rays, etc.), but not in a risk averse approach to
individual measures such as employment contracts
because the government can diversify its security
portfolios. The principal’s risk neutrality is a well
accepted assumption in the context of employment
contracts. (22)
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The government’s random net benefit can be
defined as up = x − s(x) = (1 − α)x − β
where subscript p denotes the principal. Next, we
derive the certainty equivalents for both government
and employee. The certainty equivalent of the
government is
pip = (1− α)a− β, (2)
To calculate the employee’s certainty equivalent
we need to make some assumptions on the distribu-
tion of the exogenous shock . For hyperbolic utility
functions, of which the CARA function utilized
herein is an example, negative shocks dominate the
agent’s effort choices.7 Further, agents with this type
prefer the lottery with a fixed loss L plus a random
loss around 0 to a fixed loss of 0 plus a random
loss around L; see Eeckhoudt and Schlesinger (16) for
extended discussion on the implications of this effect.
We can therefore eliminate the likely negative mean
L of  from consideration.
If the distribution of the stochastic outcomes
 is symmetric around zero, and moments greater
than two are fully described by the second moment
(variance) then the expected utility of a risk averse,
prudent agent is weakly decreasing in variance of
shocks. If we further restrict the distribution of
shocks to being Gaussian,  ∼ N (0, σ2), then the
stochastic component of the certainty equivalence
of the payoff is fully described by the variance and
is weakly decreasing in σ2. The employee certainty
equivalent payoff denoted pia is therefore be as follows
pia = αa+ β − a2 − 12rσ2α2. (3)
The last term of pia, the risk premium, is the product
of rσ2 and the incentive wage rate squared, α2.
As a starting point, suppose employee’s actions
are fully observable without costs. In this symmetric
information case, the first-best contract is attainable.
Proposition 1: If the employee’s action is fully
observable, optimal contract and joint surplus are as
follows:
α† = 0, a† = 12 , β
† = 14 , pi
†
p + pi
†
a =
1
4 (4)
7For illustration, approximate  with a one period binomial
distribution  = {−σ, σ}, for respectively a negative and
positive shock. We obtain the following values of the utility
function U(σ) = W (1 −W0) and U(−σ) = W (1 −W0e2rασ)
where W0 = −e−r(α(a+σ)+β−a2). Asymptotically, as σ →∞,
we have U(σ) = O(1) whereas U(−σ) = −eO(σ).
Proof. See Appendix: Proof of Proposition 1 
In practice, the employee’s action is largely
unobservable. Therefore, while the government wants
to maintain more than a certain level of security,
the employee may shirk his responsibilities if he
can do this without being discovered and if the
expected net gains from shirking are higher than
those from exerting due care. We refer this model
as a benchmark model, since it will be compared
with the extended model presented in the following
subsection. Hereinafter, superscript ‡ is used to
denote the benchmark model.
The problem of identifying an optimal contract
can be solved by maximizing the joint surplus pi‡a+pi
‡
p
subject to the incentive compatibility constraint: i.e.,
max
α
pia + pip subject to a ∈ arg maxpia. (5)
The remaining parameter β is identified by the
principal by setting the salary of the agent as non-
negative. The optimal contract and joint surplus can
then be expressed in terms of exogenous parameters.
Proposition 2: The optimal contract, em-
ployee’s effort and joint surplus, when the principal
is unable to observe the agents effort, are as follows:
α‡ =
1
1 + 2rσ2
, (6)
β‡ = 12rσ
2 1
(1 + 2rσ2)2
− 14
α‡
(1 + 2rσ2)
, (7)
a‡ = 12
1
1 + 2rσ2
, (8)
pi‡p + pi
‡
a = a
‡ 1
1 + 2rσ2
. (9)
under the constraint that rσ2 ≥ 12 .
Proof. See Appendix: Proof of Proposition 2 
From (6) and (8), α‡ and a‡ are strictly
decreasing in the employee’s perceived risk, rσ2.
Hence, if the employee’s perceived risk becomes
sufficiently large, it may push him away from exerting
due effort, and thus the contract may not achieve the
objectives of the principal. The constraint on σ stems
from the observation that a worker will not work for
a negative salary (β ≥ 0).
Comparing Proposition 2 with Proposition 1,
unobservable effort and subsequent moral hazard
result in the decrease in the fixed payoff and the
increase in the incentive rate from 0 to 1/(1 + 2rσ2).
They decrease the employee’s action level and the
government’s overall net benefits.
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4.2 Adding Motivations and Transferrable
Skills
At this point we incorporate the impact of
training and aspects of the agents behavior which
go beyond the standard P–A modeling approach.
We adjust the standard framework to incorporate
how motivations and transferrable skills affect the
employee’s utility, and study how the optimal
contract
〈
α‡, β‡, a‡
〉
identified in the benchmark
model changes.
Indeed, there is a growing literature that indi-
cates that an employee’s payoff might be a function
of intrinsic preferences such as job satisfaction
and peer recognition in addition to the direct
monetary rewards captured by the simplest utility
frameworks. (32,7,13,12) For example, Huselid et al. (23)
demonstrates that employee education and training
might be able to increase the employee’s intrinsic
motivation, thereby increasing his effort level and
reducing the issue of moral hazard.
Asymmetric information is a key driver of P–
A problems, the simplest being that the agent is
unaware of the principals objectives and training
can mitigate this effect by clarifying the objectives
of the agent. However, information asymmetry is
often more problematic in the opposite direction,
for instance when the cost of monitoring the agents
actions by the principal is high. When the action of
the agent is hidden from the the principal the agent
is then free to optimize their utility subject to their
own preferences. If the agent chooses to adhere to
the objectives of the principal, even if this appears
to require more costly effort than they would need to
provide given the incomplete monitoring, then the
agent must have some intrinsic dimension of their
preferences that drive their optimal choice of action.
This is often referred to as an emotional rather than
financial reward.
Another dimension to training is that it affords
the opportunity for the agent to increase their value
in the labour market by signaling the value of their
human capital. This will be a function of the relative
level of difficulty involved in completing the training.
For this to have an effect on the agents effort, there
must be an interaction of effort and difficulty within
the agents utility function.
A natural CARA utility function that accounts
for the effects above is the following one:
u = W − e−r(α+ρ)(a+)+β+γδa−(1+δ)a2 (10)
The utility function in (10) includes several addi-
tional parameters over (1), together with the terms
directly relating to the monetary rewards. In detail,
ρ captures the level of emotional satisfaction that
is fostered by the employee’s sense of responsibility
or altruism. Casadesus-Masanell (13) and Schmidt (36)
outline a theory that the agent who develops this
emotional attachment might care for the principal’s
objectives and be willing to act in the principal’s best
interest, even if the direct rewards do not correlate
to optimal effort.
The cost of psychological or cognitive effort
entailed by undertaking the job is captured by the
term −(1 + δ)a2: we follow the norm within this
area of literature by assuming that cognitive cost
is quadratic in effort as advocated by Be´nabou and
Tirole (7) amongst others. The parameter δ captures
the feeling of ‘burden’ for the employee, a perception
of the ‘difficulty’ of the job.
A high δ also indicates that the job, in all
likelihood, requires substantial skills, hence the
higher δ the more potential there is for effort a to be
‘transferrable’ into skills. Such skills give the worker
a better position in the job market. Evidence from
the interviews suggest that the harder the employee
works the more the training is valuable for future
career pathways and this factor shows strongly in
the agents stated decision making.
The forward human capital arising from these
training activities is captured by the term γδa. In the
seminal contributions by Schultz (37) and Becker, (5)
the transferability of on-the-job training into human
capital is generally modeled as being linear or
log-linear in effort and difficulty (captured in our
scenario by a and δ). Its application in the context
of P–A models, and in particular those involving
security risk based outcomes, is novel.
In our set-up the factor γ represents the trans-
ferability of effort a and burden δ into the worker’s
additional human capital and can be thought of as a
‘rate of forward transferability of effort’ (hereinafter,
referred to as transferability). When γ = 0 there is no
transfer from effort to forward looking human capital
and thus no impact on utility.
From (10), the employee’s certainty equivalent
payoff is given by
pia = (α+ ρ)a+ β + γδa− (1 + δ)a2
− 12rσ2(ρ+ α)2. (11)
By following the same procedure used with the
benchmark model, we can identify the optimal
contract and joint surplus. Let ρ∗ be an auxiliary
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function that captures the reduced level of personal
satisfaction when one discounts for both the risk
contribution 2rσ2, as in (6), and the additional effort
1 + δ that is required from the employee:
ρ∗ =
1 + ρ
1 + 2rσ2(1 + δ)
(12)
We can now compactly represent the optimal
contract and surplus for our training model and this
leads us to Proposition 3.
Proposition 3: The optimal contract and joint
surplus when motivation, burden and transferable
human capital are included, is defined by:
α∗ = ρ∗ − ρ (13)
β∗ = 12rσ
2(ρ∗)2 − 14
(γδ + ρ∗)2
1 + δ
(14)
a∗ = 12γ +
1
2
ρ∗ − γ
1 + δ
(15)
pi∗p + pi
∗
a = a
∗(1 + ρ) + 14
(γδ)2 − ρ∗(1 + ρ)
1 + δ
. (16)
Proof. See Appendix: Proof of Proposition 3 
We now summarize the direction of changes in
the equilibrium contract via the following four claims
about the agent’s behavior predicted by our extended
model.
Claim 1 As either risk aversion r or uncertainty σ2
increases, i.e., as the employee’s risk perception
increases, the power of the incentive scheme α∗
decreases. This in turn reduces the employee’s
effort level and total surplus, driving them further
away from the best outcome for the principal.
Claim 2 The increase in the emotional satisfaction, ρ
always increases the effort. However, the marginal
effectiveness of motivation decreases more than
linearly with burden δ. It also results in the
reduction of the need for the incentive scheme
α∗, since monetary rewards can be substituted by
emotional satisfaction (α∗ = ρ∗ − ρ).
Claim 3 The transferability rate, γ does not impact
the incentive rate α∗ because the former only
affects the employee and not the principal, which
has only an indirect interest in it. However, as
γ increases, the effort level and total surplus
also rise closer toward the first best outcome.
In contrast, β decreases with it, as the principal
would extract part of the future expectations on
future employability due to better skills by offering
a lower present salary.
Claim 4 The direction of the effect of changing the
degree of ‘burden’ of work effort for the agent,
δ, on the optimal level of effort a∗ depends on
the mutual relationship between transferability, γ,
emotional satisfaction ρ and the product of risk
aversion and actual risk k = rσ2. If transferability
of effort γ is sufficient by large (unambiguously
sufficient if γ is larger than 1 + ρ) then effort will
be increasing for all values of δ albeit the marginal
contribution would decrease to zero asymptotically
in δ. For a lower value of γ, there is a tipping
point as δ varies such that when γ is sufficiently
small then decreasing the burden δ would increase
effort.8
Appendix C provides formal explanations of the op-
timal α and a for the presented models with various
scenarios for the parameters. For completeness it
includes three additional claims on the equilibrium
contract which further elucidate the model outcomes.
A first important observation from the above
claims, is that the personal satisfaction (or sense
of responsibility/emotional investment) acquired by
the employee after the training positively impacts
the overall surplus, acting as a multiplier of the
effort. This is discounted more heavily than the
transferability factor by the the burden imposed for
performing the activity. Therefore, a principal needs
to exercise caution when adjusting the burden of
work, if she is relying on personal satisfaction as a
mechanism of aligning incentives, something that is
inherently difficult to measure directly.
Indeed, when the employee’s feeling of burden, δ,
is very high, the employee’s effort level, a∗, depends
only on the level of transferability of effort to human
capital, γ (i.e., limδ→∞ a∗ = γ/2). Even if difficulty
or risk of the activity are very high, the employee
will still exert effort as long as γ is positive. After
a certain threshold for δ, the incentive factor α∗
will become negative (i.e., limδ→∞ α∗ = −ρ) which
means that the principal will have to resort to fines
and punishments rather than positive incentives.
The overarching conclusion of this analysis is
that a principal planning the training of her agents
should consider adapting the level of ‘difficulty’ of
the job (by reducing the burden through training
and technology or opposedly by increasing cognitive
load by broadening roles) to the appropriate level
8 For example, if γ ≥ 1 + ρ then effort always increases with
burden δ. In contrast, if γ ≤ 1
2
(1 + ρ) and k ≤ 1, then
decreasing burden increases effort.
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of personal motivation or transferability of skills
achieved by the employees, in order to obtaining the
maximum from its employees. To correctly predict
the impact on effort of a change in conditions, the
principal needs to identify on which side of the
tipping point they are. Whilst the specific claims are
not surprising in retrospection, the model provides a
very specific categorization of the various effects and
their underlying drivers as well as the relative speed
of adjustment.
5. QUALITATIVE RESEARCH METHODS
Calibration and validation of a P–A based
model represents a significant challenge due to
the variety of factors affecting the multifaceted
relationships between the various actors. In many
cases agency costs have only been identified ex-
post after some significant event has uncovered their
existence. (21,20,34)
Traditionally, empirical studies using regression
analysis are the preferred method of choice for fitting
linear (or log-linear) P–A models to data, for exam-
ple, see Fitoussi and Gurbaxani. (19) Unfortunately,
several prior studies have indicated that pursuing
traditional regression analysis may be misleading
when an appropriate statistical model is difficult to
implement (e.g. the theoretical model does not have a
tractable Markovian representation for econometric
identification) or data is simply not available. A pure
frequentist approach to risk modeling without due
care of the conditions under which the data was
generated may lead to inappropriate policies being
enacted. Kaufmann (26) and Cramer and Thrall (14)
identify the problem of threat inflation in the
interpretation of frequentist data on terrorist attacks.
Brown and Cox (11) argue that, without proper
conditioning of attack data against appropriate
controls, the very fact that the decision to attack
is endogenous to the target choices means that
a probabilistic risk assessment will be unable to
provide meaningful insight for forward looking policy.
The first issue leads to over-investment in the
presence of threat inflation and the second, may
increase the chances of a catastrophic security failure.
Empirical studies based on qualitative methods
for analyzing P–A relationship, are less frequently
used in the literature. Some recent studies have
attempted to identify incentive structures from
first principles in a similar manner to our own
approach; see Lin and Chang (28) for example. Whilst
qualitative mapping of the theory does not provide
directly quantifiable results, the identification of
trade-offs and domains of solutions is a useful step
in understanding the resultant risks associated with
P–A problems. In absence of statistically reliable
data, the combination of a quantitative model with
qualitative evidence may be the best alternative
available to decision makers.
Our contribution is therefore to fill this gap
by mapping the results of a quantitative model to
the on-the-ground experience of key stakeholders in
aviation security through a series of semi-structured
interviews. In designing a qualitative study of this
type, Yin (42) considers three features: a topic, a data
collection method, and a source of data.
To determine the topic, we started identifying
promising general issues from the thematic analysis
of preliminary data we collected during several
meetings with aviation industry experts and work-
shops with airport stakeholders, with the support
of introductory interviews and exploratory question-
naires, properly designed to arouse broad subject
matters. (29) This first collecting phase allowed us
to narrow the focus of the research into the role of
security staff in airports and the interplay between
regulations, employment strategies, types of training
and effective security.
To collect the data, we selected the focused
interview method outlined in Merton et al. (30)
focusing on a topic of conversation determined in
advance, in the attempt to collect reactions and
interpretations in a relatively open form. Interviews
were conducted in a semi-structured form and
in a conversational mode, starting each interview
using so called ‘grand tour’ questions as discussed
by Brenner. (10) We prepared a further list of 6-
7 questions, which depended on the interviewees
responses; the list was circulated to the participants
one week before the interviews to make them aware
of the type of questions that would be asked. These
questions are reported at the end of the Appendix.
As a source of data, we chose interviewees by
judgmental or purposive sampling, (29) to capture
the variety of roles and activities related to aviation
security. A ‘gate–keeper’, in Yin’s terminology, (43)
working at Anadolu University provided the intro-
ductions and background details for the interviews.
Specifically, we interviewed 11 individuals, among
them airport security managers, private airport
security contractors and government regulators.
In Table IV we provide details on the roles
of the interviewees and their institutions. We
do not provide their names in order to protect
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Table IV . Roles of The Participants in the Semi-Structured Interviews.
#ID Role Institution Interview Date
1 Executive director responsible for safety Airport Nov 15, 2013
2 Board member for operations and regulation Airport Nov 15, 2013
3 Executive director responsible for safety Airport Nov 15, 2013
4 Board member for operations and regulation Airport Nov 15, 2013
5 Senior manager in charge of training programs Civil Aviation Authority Feb 27, 2014
6 Senior manager in charge of training programs Civil Aviation Authority Feb 27, 2014
7 Chief of Security Operations Private Security Contractor Feb 28, 2014
8 Chief of Security Operations Civil Aviation Authority Feb 28, 2014
9 Senior airport manager Airport Nov 15, 2013
10 Senior airport manager Airport Nov 15, 2013
11 Senior manager in charge of training programs Airport Nov 15, 2013
their anonymity. The interviews took place aside
two different national workshops organized by the
University of Anadolu for civil aviation security
stakeholders and have been carried out in separate
rooms by the same interviewers. The sampling for the
interviews had been set in advance with the support
of the gatekeeper. Interviews lasted approximately
30-40 minutes and sometimes a translator attended
an interview, ensuring better comprehension by
the interviewers and the interviewees. The inter-
views were audio recorded with the permission of
the interviewees and subsequently transcribed. In
parallel, hand notes have been taken during the
conversation, to collect details and information about
feeling, perceptions and preliminary reflections of the
interviewers.
6. EVIDENCE FROM INTERVIEWS
In this section we provide an overview of how
our stakeholders perceive risk and how the impact
of the heterogeneity of risk perceptions impacts
airport security in Turkey. Then we explore various
agency problems experienced by Turkish airports
and apply the results of our model to investigate
the effects of the employee’s motivations either in
terms of increase of forward human capital or sense
of responsibility. The final subsection investigates
whether a security training program can effectively
incentivize the employee to exert due effort, and
reduce moral hazard. The answers to our questions
illustrate some of the specific channels of agency
costs that we have quantified in our model alongside
the representative parameters and their domains. It
shows that, as the model predicted, an appropriate
portfolio of training must includes actions that make
skills transferable into a forward human capital.
Where we summarize general points put forward
by one or more of the interviewees we reference
them by use of square brackets, for instance [# 1] to
represent the executive director responsible for safety
listed in Table IV . Specific quotes are reported in
italics with the attribution placed before the quote,
once again in square brackets and marked with a
colon.
6.1 General Information and Risk Perception
The complex geo-political situation in Turkey
is perceived to have an impact on the airport
security domain. An important characteristic that
the interviewees exhibited was a high level of
‘philosophical’ alignment with the overarching policy
objectives of the principal. The following extracts
relate to the institutional and societal factors that
can affect security effectiveness.
[# 2]: “Turkish people are used to be checked with x-ray,
even to enter into a mall they are X-ray checked. We
want to keep this security measure. [Interviewer: isn’t it
very expensive?] Sure, but if something bad happens, then
it will be more expensive. [...] I do not want anything bad
happens [sic]. If you want to travel, you are checked and
that is all. If you do not want, you do not travel.”
Most interviewees supported the implementation of
a wider detection system in strict collaboration with
intelligence services, hoping that
[# 3]: “Once you arrive at the airport, everything should
be already done.”
The perceptions of risk displayed by the stakeholders
was somewhat heterogeneous. Prior research on the
qualitative evaluation of risk perception indicates
that one of the main factors that shapes attitudes
towards risk is the trust expressed in the rules gov-
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erning security. (41) In the course of our interviews,
we noted the interviewees’ general dissatisfaction on
the current security regulations governing airport
security; the rules being perceived as weak and
incomplete for the purpose of mitigating threats and
reducing risks.
[# 1]: “In the (airport security) regulations, there are
few things about practice [that] matters. They are based
on regulatory compliance. If you are compliant with a
regulation, the government think you are a secure one
[sic]. [...] For example, [the government inspects whether]
you use the tools that are requested. Yes or no, black or
white? But what about the other things?”
A consensus amongst the interviewees was that
regulations list mandatory duties that managers were
required to adhere to without substantive added
value to the overall level of security.
Another important factor that affects the risk
perception is the relationships between the author-
ities designated for the application of the security
rules. (41) The majority of interviewees expressed
opinions on the poor cooperation between the various
actors involved in airport security, particularly
between security staff and police officers.
[# 10]: “[Police officers] think that the whole department
is belonging to them [sic]. They are out of training, they
do not have specific info on airport security. [Interviewer:
What happens if something happens?] Police takes
responsibility on this. [Interviewer: Would it better to
have only private guards?] No, police is really needed, but
educated police.”
6.2 Agency Costs, Employment Rules, and
Roles
The DGCA regularly conduct inspections and
security audits on airports in Turkey. Interviewees
[# 1, 4, 5, 6, 8, 11] indicated that the purpose is
explicitly for monitoring as opposed to information
gathering for more general development of security
methods. They also pointed out that this monitoring
was incomplete. Typically, the DGCA would not be
able to perfectly observe actions of all participants
including airport employees. A typical P–A approach
indicates that a principal will attempt to design a
contract that ensures that an agent bears, in whole
or in part, the expected costs of shirking. In airport
security, however, this might not be entirely feasible.
Risks related to a terrorist events have a high
impact, but occur with very low probability. (6) Once
a terrorist event occurs, if security personnel are
found to be liable then they will not, in all likelihood,
be able to provide full ex-post compensation for the
damage. Hence the security risk cannot be wholly
transferred to the agent from the principal via some
form of tort mechanism.
Gross dereliction of duty not-withstanding, the
precise chain of events leading to a successful ter-
rorist attack are usually very difficult to reconstruct.
It may be impossible to identify the exact point in
the security chain where a security staff member has
allowed a successful attack to occur, due to their
specific reduced effort. (18) The ability of an attacker
to gain the information needed for a successful attack
may have been collected weeks earlier by observing
other agents not correctly performing their task.
Together with imperfect monitoring, this can result
in a sub-optimal contract, from the viewpoint of
incentive compatibility, between the principal and
the agent.
An important counter to the monitoring issue
is the very nature of the Turkish job market.
Turkey has a large working age population, and
many Turkish citizens will accept a job even if the
salary places their reservation utility at or close to
zero. This implies that the employee, particularly
the security staff, perceive a high level of risk to
earnings in the job market (i.e., rσ2 is high). Our
interviewees also stated that employment contracts
for security staff in an airport are based on a fixed
wage contract (i.e., α ≈ 0) [# 3, 7], and that this
type of job generally attracts workers who only have
limited job alternatives (i.e.,γ ≈ 0) [# 1, 7]. This
finding is similar to other case studies in supply chain
security. (6)
[# 7]: “Payment (for security staff) is very low. For this
reason, a lot of [sic] person change job, security persons
do not think that this is a very important job. They just
come, work little time and then they leave.”
Additionally, interviewee [# 3] presented an argu-
ment that most security staff are not aware of
the importance of their role and do not feel the
responsibility or motivation to conduct the job in a
professional manner (i.e., ρ ≈ 0). The low wages for
security staff and quality of employees results in high
employee turnover rate [# 1, 4].
[# 1]: “[G]uys working for these security companies (in
an airport) have no other choices for working so they have
to work there if they want to earn money, but the problem
is that they are not motivated enough.”
This is consistent with the interpretation of (15),
where low levels of monetary and non-monetary
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incentives and high level of the employee’s perceived
risk result in a lower than optimal levels of effort.
As previously stated, the airport as a private
organization and the DGCA as a public body
have complex liability sharing arrangements. One
interviewee [# 6] clarified that airport operators are
responsible for any damage from a security related
event. Operators will then entrust some of their
risks to their employees. Yet, if the employees are
compensated with low wages, society at large will be
liable for the whole costs of a security failure. (6)
The costs associated with P–A effects is often
found to increase when opportunities to switch
employment are high. As such, the degree of
human capital invested by the agent in his current
position is therefore quite low. It should be noted
that some security activities (e.g., liquid detection)
are relatively easy to monitor as technology has
automated many of these types of processes; and,
as such, staff only need to respond to an alarm,
rather than engage in costly cognitive effort to
ensure the efficacy of the ongoing security operation.
Some security activities (e.g., X–Ray screening) still
require substantial cognitive and, in some cases,
physical effort and for many cases monitoring the
employees’ actions is either expensive or, indeed,
logistically impossible.
6.3 Roles and Responsibility vs
Compensation
There is substantial evidence from prior liter-
ature that the mix of compensation, fixed versus
performance related, is a driving factor in the effort
exerted by agents. (6) For example, in organizations
in aviation security highly qualified workers will only
be attracted by high incentives. The corresponding
evidence can be found in a report published by
U.S. General Accounting Office. (40) According to the
report, one of the main reasons that airport screeners
do not perform their work properly is partly because
the low compensation prevents an airport from hiring
and retaining qualified workers with high intrinsic
motivation.
The perception of interviewees in the Turkish
case, [# 1, 3, 7], indicated that the level of pay,
compared to other service workers, is not expected to
change significantly in the near future, although some
recent modest increases have been noted. However,
some previous studies have indicated that motivating
employees by increasing their intrinsic preferences
can improve the gap in optimal effort that may
have been perceived between the principal and the
agent. (32,7,12)
Our interviewees identified differences in in-
trinsic motivation between airport staff and police,
recalling the earlier comments on cooperation. The
cultural role of the police within Turkish civil society
was indicated to be an important driver of this sense
of civic responsibility and hence reduced the agency
costs we have previously identified. This appeared
to have a negative impact on the security staff who
perceived a degree of exclusion from this culture.
[# 1]: “Security staff just help the police and they only
have limited responsibility because the responsibility is
taken from the state security department (i.e., the police).
Since the department do not have enough police officers,
airport security staff are needed as well.”
Uniformly, the interviewees noted that police officers
are working directly for the government and follow
a different statute and culture [# 3, 7]. They have
more power and responsibilities [# 3], and airport
operators have not the right to audit them because
they are directly employed by the state [# 7]. Yet,
airport police officers are not specifically trained for
airport security [# 2, 3] and furthermore, they do not
have a security training program specifically designed
for them in respect of aviation security.
[# 2]: “Police officers working near the Syrian
boundaries have to be really very careful about possible
terrorist attacks; they work there and then after 3 years
they come to our airport and they behave the same.
This is not good because the context has changes, [it]
is really different...They read the regulations we have,
but they do not know which is the difference between
should/would/must/could.”
In contrast, airport police officers have more respon-
sibilities than airport security staff. When there is
a security event, security staff need to report to the
police and the police ‘have the final responsibility’ as
paraphrased from comments by [# 1, 3, 7, 10]. One
of our interviewees provided a qualitative summary
of the ordering of responsibility between airport
security staff and the police:
[# 3]: “Security people have some responsibilities but
police has more responsibilities, so security people are
quite happy for this [sic]. If they find something risky
in the bags, you [security staff] call the police and they
[police] have to manage it”
Police officers seem to feel responsible for airport
security. Furthermore, they have a higher fixed
wage than security staff [# 7]. The police service
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can, therefore, attract better qualified and possibly
motivated applicants. In the terminology of our
motivation and training model, the burden of
training δ would be very low whereas a police officer’s
feeling of responsibility, ρ, would be higher than zero.
Therefore, even if police officers’ salary is based
on a fixed wage (i.e., α ≈ 0), they might exert
a positive level of effort which can mitigate some
moral hazard problem. From (15) their optimal effort
level can be regarded as a = ρ2 with α = 0. Yet,
a common feature of the interviewees’ interaction
with law enforcement was their perception that the
expertise of the police and, in some cases, their
motivation were very low.
[# 2]: “They should have an appropriate and suitable
training to do the security at the airport, and this training
is different from the training required for the Syrian
boundaries.”
As a result, it is unclear whether the increased effort
level due to higher ρ can effectively increase the
social surplus. An alternative explanation is that
their effort may be linked to transferable value from
effort. Police often change duties and agglomerate
experience and know-how. In some cases, this may
prove valuable in their future career and as such
exhibiting greater effort provides direct utility to
them via the standard rational utility maximization
mechanism (γ > 0). In other cases, exercising effort
may not make sense (γ = 0):
[# 7]: “The problem is that they change, they do not
know what airport security is. Sometimes in 6 months
they change role twice. They change job position very
often, they are not trained on the civil aviation security.
In 6 months it could happen that they have to change 3
times their job.”
Since security expertise is scarce, interviewees
stated that most staff need to be trained from scratch
which incurs additional significant costs.
[# 1]: “We have good security devices. However, there
are not enough security training agencies in Turkey
particularly specialized in aviation security. They are not
efficient, so even if we had more money to invest, it would
be difficult to find a good training. Training is mandated
but not enough. We have to pay for further training...[It
is] very difficult to train them. This is a general problem
in Turkey, they do not earn a lot of money; but, they do
a very critical job.”
As previously indicated, the payment scheme for
security staff is based on a fixed salary β and the
incentive rate for exerting effort is quite weak (i.e.,
α ≈ 0). The current approach targets raising fixed
salaries. The primary driver behind their rationale is
that with higher salary there is a positive movement
in the agents motivation (i.e., ρ > 0) and the
employees will subsequently exert more effort and
that this effort may be more effective in mitigating
security threats.
[# 7]: “[...] security personnel has a big responsibility.
So last year, we decided to raise their salary and now we
pay them more. The situation now is better.”
However, many airports in Turkey are not able
to afford the additional costs associated with this
increase in salary, and tend to depend on security
training offered by DGCA attempting to raise
the employee’s intrinsic motivation. The interview
results indicate that most of the interviewees
believe that security training can remedy incentive
compatibility problems. This is also argued in the
literature. (23)
[# 3]: “You cannot easily change the physical environ-
ment but you can change people. So we have to improve
training (and) people’s vision [...] If you are better trained
you feel more confident [even] if you are badly paid”
From the perspective of the quantitative analysis, a
personalized record of training permits the agent to
‘deepen’ their personal human capital, γ > 0 and
increase motivation ρ > 0.
6.4 General and Technical Specific Training
In Turkey, most of the security training programs
are designed and provided by the DGCA: while
there are also private agencies that provide training
programs, particularly for more specific security
technologies; training programs provided by the
state are the main source of staff development for
those employed in an airport. According to the
interviewees, the quality of private training programs
was usually better than the quality of programs
offered by the state. However, private trainings are
less widely used since these have a higher cost
provision requirement [# 7, 10]. Therefore, we focus
our exploration only on training programs offered
by DGCA, with some limited reference to extra
training programs, such as those offered by IATA and
documented in Table II .
The interviewees indicated that the security
training is effectively the same for all airports no
matter the size.
[# 6]: “We have training for all people involved in the
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airport security, as this personnel could be a potential
threat to the security of the airport. [sic] In airport every
person has a role and a duty in aviation security, so we
need to train all of them in order to provide total security.
We have to train them in aviation security procedures,
national and international as well.”
The interviewees provided further details on
training programs which use two different types of
approaches: ‘strategic’ and ‘technical’. From the in-
terviewees, training using a strategic approach aims
at providing efficiency that ensure the achievement
of a firm’s general business objectives (i.e., general
security training), while training with a technical
approach focuses on shaping a wide range of technical
and professional practices (i.e., technical specific
security training).
During the interviews three security training
modules were identified by the interviewees as being
mandated by the regulator [# 6, 11]. Module 1 is
security awareness training that is mandatory for
all attendants, staff and managers in an airport.
Modules 2 and 3 are for training security staff; this
includes X-ray and metal detector operators and
cabin crew.
While the main objective of Module 1 is to
transfer ubiquitous security knowledge (required for
all staff) and to clarify the importance of airport
security (the specific objectives of the principal)
and, by construction, increasing security awareness;
Modules 2 and 3 focus more on transferring specific
knowledge for certain security work. According to
interviewee [# 11], Modules 2 and 3 are compulsory
and are more specific compared to Module 1. Every
airport in Turkey has to follow the procedures for
Modules 2 and 3 very precisely. It was further
noted that Modules 2 and 3 require more resources
and information for training. Interviewee [# 5] also
stated that, while DGCA does not have any different
implementation procedures for security awareness
training, it does have specific training programs for
educating the personnel working in different roles.
[# 5]: “Security awareness training is for everyone in
the airport because it is an indispensable part of airport
security. On the other hand, training implementation has
to be different for different roles; you cannot implement
the same rules for cabin crew and ground service people
or screening staff in security check points.”
As such, employees have differentiated training
depending on their specific duties. Training varies
from person to person, and from department to
department.
General security training programs are provided
in a classroom environment. Several interviewees
[# 10,11] stated that classroom training programs
are boring and trainees were not motivated to follow
them.
[# 11]: “[General] Training, as it is, is boring, people
are not motivated to follow it. They learn more while
working. Time is short and lessons are boring. It is not
very effective.”
Linking these observations with our motivation
and training model, training for general knowledge
transfer of security might only incur a burden on
the employees (i.e., δ > 0) and will not provide
the employees with the recognition of their role in
ensuring airport security (i.e., ρ ≈ 0) as indicated by
interviewee [# 11].
An alternative explanation could be that general
training modules were badly designed. Yet, none
of the interviewees singled out the trainers for
criticism. As interviewees have been often brutally
honest even in criticism of other officials (e.g. police
officers or even regulators approach to security and
compliance), we believe they would have raised
the issue at some point. Quality is likely a non-
issue because there is a close mapping between
DGCA modules and IATA modules, as we shown in
Table II ,. Training on IATA modules is expensive
and typically one or two members of a security
team take the IATA modules and then implement
the local modules to the various regional airport
security teams. The IATA modules are used in every
country including the G7 and emerging economies.
So a defective general training module in the IATA
syllabus would be quickly remediated and there is
evidence of this syllabus development from cursory
analysis of the historical copies of the IATA and
DGCA handbooks.
Consequently, while general security training is
indispensable for enhancing security awareness as
discussed by interviewee [# 5], it is unhelpful to
increase employees’ motivation and thus to reduce
moral hazard. General security training does not
provide a specific certification to a qualified trainee
and does not require an exam. Employees only need
to retake a training program once in every 3 years.
This implies that the general security training does
not provide any information on the employee’s repute
and not increase his level of employability (i.e., γ ≈
0). Consequently, general security training might not
be helpful to increase employees’ motivation and to
reduce moral hazard (i.e., a ≈ 0) — indicated in
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Claim 7 in the Appendix. Indeed, this is common
impression some of the interviewees have expressed
about general security training.
We now consider the effectiveness of a training
program aiming at transferring specific technical
knowledge (i.e., technical specific security training).
A training manager [# 11] explained that Modules
2 and 3 are carried out by on-the-job training and
practical exercises as well as classroom lectures.
This approach was deemed to be very effective in
motivating trainees and in attaining skills (i.e., ρ >
0) notwithstanding the higher burden on the trainees
than a general security training program (i.e., δ > 0).
The other facet of technical specific security
training is the mandatory renewal of employees
certification and the possible loss of the job due
to a failure of renewing one’s certification [# 5,
6, 11]. In Turkey, security staff need to retake
Module 2 and Module 3 every 2 years to renew
their certification. This is accomplished through an
examination conducted by the Training Department
of Aviation Security. If they cannot pass the exam,
their certification is canceled and they can no longer
work for an airport.
[# 7]: “When we are selecting persons, we use a lot of
criteria. For example, we need to know whether X-ray
operators are able to use that technology, so we need to
have an examination, [sic] because probably they have no
experience.”
We can interpret technical specific training as
providing a degree of transferable value from effort.
This type of training provides certification and
expertise that can be used for later employment. The
interviewees indicated that in a tough job market this
is an ‘undeniable asset’ [# 9, 11].
[# 7]: “There is a special team for checking [...] We want
to know their experience, if they have been working for at
least 3 years and then we evaluate them. If the level if
very low we do not hire them. Since our salary is higher
than others, there are a lot of people that want to work
with us. For these reasons, when we are selecting persons
we use a lot of criteria.”
From our analysis in §(4), the optimal effort level is
a = γδ+ρ2(1+δ) . From inspection we can see that this is
always greater than the optimal effort level without
monetary and intrinsic incentives. Furthermore, even
if the employee’s feeling of burden is very high, the
training can still lead to a positive level of effort (i.e.,
a = 12γ) as long as the level of transferability has a
positive value (γ > 0).
A core conclusion appears to be that general
security training develops employees’ motivation and
understanding of the rationale behind their tasks,
but mitigates a moral hazard problem only in part.
It becomes increasingly less effective as a the burden
increases. Transferability of value from effort, i.e.
learning technical skills that are important for job
retention, appears to be an important factor in the
employees pay-off function.
7. CONCLUSIONS
This study seeks to elucidate the incentive
structure of workers engaged in facilitating risk
reduction in an important security setting. Prior
studies of ex-post failings in complex socio technical
systems (in relation to both security events and
accidents) have often demonstrated the causal link
between failures stemming from the alignment of
incentives and catastrophic outcomes. A striking
example can be seen in Suzuki, (38) on page 1251. The
author describes in detail an after-the-fact summary
of the agency costs associated with moral hazard and
information asymmetry for nuclear safety in Japan.
Our approach seeks to identify P–A issues a-
priori to help reduce the likelihood of catastrophic
security failures by illustrating to policy makers the
risk structures that they are facing and the possible
mechanisms that drive the equilibrium decision
making of agents acting on behalf of a principal.
We have outlined a set of models that specifically
address the optimal contract to align incentives
within an airport security setting. Our initial model
specification mimics the typical P–A setting with
only the agents pay-off relating directly to effort
entering into the optimal solution. Our second
model, incorporates trade-offs in welfare that contain
feelings of well being not strictly associated with
strictly financial pay-offs. We have then identified a
set of potential trade-offs in terms of effort, cognitive
and physical burden and transferable human capital
on behalf of the individual security agent versus a
remuneration contract that combines fixed wages and
incremental contributions. Our quantitative findings
have been validated by a qualitative study conducted
on security staff operating in an airport in a
reasonably high risk geographical setting.
Our quantitative and qualitative findings demon-
strate that risk mitigation measures should account
for the marginal effects of risk aversion, marginal
transferability of effort & cognitive load and the basic
burden of effort. We build a model that includes
transferable skills and ‘intrinsic’ or ‘emotional’ buy-
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in from changes in training regimes in addition to
forward looking measures of human capital building.
This is quite an attractive decomposition and can
lead to the following effects that must be considered
by the risk analyst designing the mix of training
regimes for staff:
• a better motivated worker may do more (the
ρa term dominates the payoff) until the cog-
nitive effort in training and actions becomes
too burdensome (the δa2 term dominates the
payoff);
• a higher skilled worker may work harder as
their degree of skill increases (the γδa term
dominates), as this improves their expected
pay-off from forward-looking human capital.
One effect may dominate the others, given the
conditions in the field. Our preliminary evidence
suggest that training that incorporates a forward
looking component that builds human capital ap-
pears to dominate training designed to elicit a greater
intrinsic motivation.
For tractability and ease of exposition our
risk generating mechanism assumes a ‘non-strategic’
exogenous attacker. Targeted attacks exploiting
security lapses from agency costs would in general
be more successful, magnifying the costs of the
effects we have identified. Whilst endogenizing
attacker externalities as either a sub-game or as
a simultaneous equilibrium mathematically intricate
this would be the obvious extension to our theoretical
model.
Our analysis shows that the methodological
approach of this paper (combine a quantitative
principal-agent (P–A) model for modeling the effec-
tive effort of security personnel with a qualitative
case study to validate the outcomes suggested by the
model) can successfully contribute to risk analysis
when empirical evidence is limited and controlled
studies are ethically impossible.
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APPENDIX
A Proofs of Propositions
Here we provide the proofs of the propositions and the
claims presented in §(4). It is intended to be an electronic
supplement.
As a preliminary result we derive the certainty equivalent
forms found in Equations (2) and (3). Suppose that the risk
averse employee has an exponential utility function ua =
−e−rw, where w = s(x) − a2 and w ∼ N (µ, σ2). The
corresponding density function for w is given as
f(w) =
1
σ
√
2pi
e
(
− (w−µ)
2
2σ2
)
.
Therefore, the expected utility can be defined as
E[ua] = −E[−e−rw]
= −
∫ ∞
−∞
e−rw
1
σ
√
2pi
e
(
− (w−µ)
2
2σ2
)
dw
= − 1
σ
√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
e
(
−rw− (w−µ)
2
2σ2
)
dw.
Noting that
−rw − (w − µ)
2
2σ2
= −rw − (w − µ)
2
2σ2
+ rµ− rµ+ r
2σ2
2
− r
2σ2
2
= − 1
2
(
2r(w − µ) + (w − µ)
2
σ2
+ r2σ2
)
− rµ+ r
2σ2
2
= − 1
2σ2
((w − µ) + rσ2)2 − rµ+ r
2σ2
2
.
From this, we can see that
E[ua] = − 1
σ
√
2pi
e
(
−rµ+ r2σ2
2
) ∫ ∞
−∞
e
(
− y2
2σ2
)
dw
where y denotes ((w − µ) + rσ2). Since
g(y) = − 1
σ
√
2pi
e
(
− y2
2σ2
)
is the probability density function for random variable y which
has normal distribution with 0 and variance σ2, and therefore
− 1
σ
√
2pi
∫ ∞
−∞
e
(
− y2
2σ2
)
dy = 1,
we obtain
E[ua] = − 1
σ
√
2pi
e
(
−rµ+ r2σ2
2
) ∫ ∞
−∞
e
(
− y2
2σ2
)
dy
= −e−r
(
µ+ rσ
2
2
)
.
From the certainty equivalent theorem, u(pia) = E[ua].
We therefore get
pia = µ− rσ
2
2
= E(w)− rV ar(w)
2
.
Since w = s(x)− a2 = α(a+ ) + β− a2, the agent’s certainty
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equivalent is given as
pia = αa+ β − a2 − 12 rα2σ2.
The government is risk neutral and has net benefit up = (1−
α)(a+)−β. Therefore, the government’s expected net benefit
can be defined as
E[up] = a− αa− β.
Since u(pip) = E[up], the government’s certainty equivalent is
pip = a− αa− β.
Proof. [Proposition 1] If the employee’s action is observ-
able without costs, the government does not need to take an
incentive compatibility constraint into account, and only needs
to pay the employee for his action that can guarantee his
participation. Hence, the employee’s participation constraint
holds with equality, and we set the employee’s reservation
utility equals to zero (i.e., pia = 0). The government’s problem
is then to solve the following maximization problem.
max
a
pia + pip = max
a
a− a2 − 1
2
rα2σ2. (A.1)
It entails the employee to make the level of action a† = 1/2.
Inserting this value into the joint surplus and maximizing it
with respect to α yields α† = 0. Using a† and α† in the
participation constraint, we get β† = 1/4 which equals to
the cost of his action. Consequently, the government gets net
benefits of 1/4.
Proof. [Proposition 2] In order to identify optimal α and
β, we first need to explore the employee’s problem. Since his
problem is to identify an optimal effort level that can maximize
pia for given α and β, it can be denoted as maxapia and gives
the first-order condition a‡ = α/2.
Therefore, if incentive wage is not provided (i.e., α = 0),
the employee will not carry out any action (i.e., a = 0).
This condition shows that an optimal action level is only
determined by an incentive rate α. Moreover, the condition
also means that the employee’s marginal benefits of action
(i.e., marginal expected reward) are equal to his marginal costs
of action.
By inserting optimal effort level a‡ = α/2 into (5), we
can drop the incentive compatibility constraint and rewrite it
as:
max
α
α
2
−
(α
2
)2 − 1
2
rα2σ2. (A.2)
This problem has the first-order condition 1/2−α/2−rασ2 =
0. Rearranging this equation with respect to α gives
α‡ =
1
(1 + 2rσ2)
.
Inserting this value into a‡ = α/2 and (5) clearly yields
a‡ =
1
2(1 + 2rσ2)
pi‡p + pi
‡
a =
1
4(1 + 2rσ2)
.
Furthermore, inserting α‡ and a‡ into pi‡a and setting this to
0 yields equation (7) below.
β‡ = 1
4
α2
(−1 + 2rσ2) = 2rσ2 − 1
4(1 + 2rσ2)2
.
Proof. [Proposition 3] When the intrinsic incentives are
taken into account, in the first stage, the employee chooses
his action a for the given satisfaction ρ, burden δ and returns
from the burden γ. Therefore, his problem is to decide an effort
level a, such that pi∗a is maximized for given α, β, ρ, δ and γ:
max
a
pi∗a. The optimal effort therefore is
a∗ =
α+ γδ + ρ
2(1 + δ)
. (A.3)
This implies that the employee who has developed a positive
level of ρ is willing to exert a strictly positive amount of effort
even if there is no monetary incentive, α. A positive level of γ
will also increase the employee’s effort level, if he bears some
psychological burden (i.e., δ > 0).
The government’s certainty equivalent is identical with
(2). Inserting (A.3) into the joint surplus and writing it as a
maximization problem with respect to α yields
max
α
−(−2+α)α+(γδ+ρ)(2+γδ+ρ)
4(1+δ)
− 2r(1+δ)(α+ρ)2σ2
4(1+δ)
.
The first order condition therefore is
1− α
2 + 2δ
− r(α+ ρ)σ2 = 0,
and rewriting this gives the optimal incentive rate as a function
of the employee’s burden and satisfaction:
α∗ =
1 + ρ
1 + 2(1 + δ)rσ2
− ρ. (A.4)
Inserting this into (A.3) yields the agent’s optimal effort with
a∗ =
1 + ρ+ γδ(1 + 2(1 + δ)rσ2)
2(1 + δ)(1 + 2(1 + δ)rσ2)
. (A.5)
Re-arranging terms and splitting the fraction yields the desired
value.
By setting (11) to zero and substituting a with a∗, the
fixed wage β∗ as a function of α∗ can be given as:
β∗ = 1
2
(α∗ + ρ)2rσ2 − (α
∗ + γδ + ρ)2
4(1 + δ)
The total surplus from taking into account intrinsic
incentives can be written as:
pi∗p + pi
∗
a =
(1+γδ+ρ)2+2γδ(1+δ)(2+γδ+2ρ)rσ2
4(1+δ)(1+2(1+δ)rσ2)
. (A.6)
Algebraic rearrangement and substitution of rho∗, a∗ and α∗
provides the required result.
B Sensitivity Analysis
The following statements show the results of sensitivity
analysis for the optimal values listed in §(4). For simplicity of
exposition, we denote k = rσ2.
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Claim 1: An increase in k results in ∂α∗/∂k < 0,
∂a∗/∂k < 0 and ∂(pi∗a + pi∗p)/∂k < 0.
The proof proceeds by cases for each derivative of the optimal
values. We suppose k ≥ 0, ρ ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0 and δ ≥ 0.
(i) The derivative of α∗ with respect to k is less than zero
because
∂α∗
∂k
= − 2(1 + δ)(1 + ρ)
(1 + 2k(1 + δ))2
.
(ii) The derivative of a∗ with respect to k is less than zero
since
∂a∗
∂k
= − 1 + ρ
(1 + 2k(1 + δ))2
.
(iii) The derivative of pi∗a +pi∗p with respect to k is less than
zero since
∂(pi∗a + pi∗p)
∂k
= − (1 + ρ)
2
2(1 + 2k(1 + δ))2
.
Claim 2: The change in ρ results in ∂α∗/∂ρ < 0,
∂a∗/∂ρ > 0 and ∂(pi∗a + pi∗p)/∂ρ > 0.
Proof. The proof is divided for each derivative of the
optimal values. We suppose k ≥ 0, ρ ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0 and δ ≥ 0.
(i) The derivative of α∗ with respect to ρ is less than zero
because
∂α∗
∂ρ
= − 2k(1 + δ)
1 + 2k(1 + δ)
.
(ii) The derivative of a∗ with respect to ρ is greater than
zero since
∂a∗
∂ρ
=
1
2(1 + δ)(1 + 2k(1 + δ))
.
(iii) The derivative of pi∗a + pi∗p with respect to ρ is greater
than zero since
∂(pi∗a + pi∗p)
∂ρ
=
1 + ρ+ γδ(1 + 2k(1 + δ))
2 (1 + δ + 2k(1 + δ)2)
.
Note that it is always ∂a
∗
∂ρ
≥ 0 and ∂a∗
∂ρ
= O( 1
δ2
), and
therefore, as δ → 0, ∂a∗
∂ρ
→∞ and as δ →∞, ∂a∗
∂ρ
→ 0.
Claim 3: From (A.4), it can be identified that the change
in γ results in ∂α∗/∂γ = 0. However, from (A.3) and (A.6), it
can easily found that ∂a∗/∂γ > 0 and ∂(pi∗a + pi∗p)/∂γ > 0.
The proof proceeds by cases for each derivative of the optimal
values. The derivative of α∗ with respect to γ is zero because
α∗ does not depend on γ.
Both the derivative of a∗ with respect to γ and the
derivative of pi∗a + pi∗p are greater than zero since
∂a∗
∂γ
=
δ
2(1 + δ)
, and
∂(pi∗a + pi∗p)
∂γ
=
δ(1 + γδ + ρ)
2(1 + δ)
.
Claim 4: For all values of δ, ∂α∗/∂δ < 0. For γ ≥ 1 + ρ
the derivative ∂α∗/∂δ > 0.
The proof proceeds by cases on the partial derivatives.
(1) The derivative of α∗ with respect to δ is always less than
zero because
∂α∗
∂δ
= − 2k(1 + ρ)
(1 + 2k(1 + δ))2
(2) The derivative of the optimal incentive rate a∗ with respect
to δ is
∂a∗
∂δ
=
γ(1 + 2k(1 + δ))2 − (1 + ρ)(1 + 4k(1 + δ))
2(1 + δ)2(1 + 2k(1 + δ))2
The direction of this derivative cannot be determined
unambiguously for a∗ since it depends on the relationship
among γ, δ, k and ρ. To identify the tipping point, fixing
∆ = 2k(1 + δ) and Γ = 1+ρ
γ
were Γ ≥ 1 and substituting for
∆ into equations (A.5) and (B.1) yields
a∗ =
γ
2
− kγ
∆
+
k(1 + ρ)
∆(1 + ∆)
∂a∗
∂δ
= 2k2
γ∆2 + 2(γ − (1 + ρ))∆ + γ − (1 + ρ))
∆2(1 + ∆)2
For γ ≥ 1 + ρ the derivative is always positive for all values
of δ. So an increase in burden would always yield an increase
in effort if the transferability coefficient is sufficiently large.
However, as δ → ∞ (and hence ∆ → ∞) the effort converges
to γ/2 and the marginal contribution of the burden to effort
becomes negligible as the denominator of the partial derivative
grows as O(δ4) whereas the numerator grows as O(δ2).
When γ is less than 1+ρ there is a tipping point in δ such that
decreasing the burden increases the effort as the derivative is
negative. As δ → 0 the effort goes to infinity. Solving the
equation of the numerator of the partial derivative yields the
condition
∆ ≤ Γ− 1 +
√
Γ(Γ− 1 (B.1)
If 1+ρ
γ
≥ 2 then √Γ(Γ− 1) ≥ 1 and therefore a sufficient
condition is ∆ ≤ Γ. Replacing the abbreviations ∆ and Γ with
their underlying terms yields δ ≤ 1+ρ
2kγ
− 1 which is satisfied
for δ ≥ 0 when 1+ρ
γ
≥ 2k i.e. when k ≤ 1.
(3) The derivative of the total surplus (pi∗a + pi∗p) with respect to
δ is given by
∂(pi∗a + pi∗p)
∂δ
=
γ
(
γδ2 + 2γδ + 2ρ+ 2
)
4(δ + 1)2
+
−ρ2 − 2ρ− 1
2(δ + 1)2 (2δk + 2k + 1)
+
ρ2 + 2ρ+ 1
4(δ + 1)2 (2δk + 2k + 1)2
Similarly to the sub-case for ∂a∗/∂δ the direction of the
derivative is dependent on the magnitudes of ρ, γ, k and δ
itself. However, the calculation of the tipping point is less
straightforward. Setting K = γ2k2 we can rewrite B.2 as the
following polynomial:
∂(pi∗a + pi∗p)
∂δ
= C (1) + C (2)Γ + C (3)Γ2
where C (1) = 1
4
γ2 − K∆−2, C (2) = 2K∆−2 and C (3) =
K(1 + ∆)−1 −K∆−2.
This polynomial has a positive real root in Γ of R(1) =
(∆+1)
2(2∆k+k)
(
∆
√
2∆ + 4k2 + 1 + 2(∆ + 1)k
)
. When Γ = R(1)
the derivative of the total surplus is equal to zero and as such
this is the critical tipping point after which an increase in δ
will, ceteris paribus, lead to an increase in total effort, however
when Γ < R(1) total surplus decreases with increasing burden.
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C Optimal α and a for different scenarios
We now compare the optimal α and a for different models
with various assumptions for the parameters. A series of
auxiliary claims are developed.
Claim 5: If the incentive rate equals zero (α = 0),
the optimal effort level for the model with motivations and
training might be higher than that in the benchmark model.
From a‡ = α
2
in (8) and a∗ = α+γδ+ρ
2(1+δ)
in (15), we can compare
a‡ and a∗ for various scenarios. Since α = 0, we have
(i) ρ > 0, δ = 0, γ = 0: a∗ = ρ
2
> 0.
(ii) ρ > 0, δ > 0, γ = 0: a∗ = ρ
2(1+δ)
> 0.
(iii) ρ > 0, δ > 0, γ > 0: a∗ = γδ+ρ
2(1+δ)
> 0.
(iv) ρ = 0, δ > 0, γ = 0: a∗ = 0.
(v) ρ = 0, δ > 0, γ > 0: a∗ = γδ
2(1+δ)
> 0.
The case where δ = 0 and γ > 0 is omitted since it is
unrealistic.
As can be seen, as long as ρ or γ is greater than zero, a
positive effort can be exerted. However, if both ρ and γ are
zero (i.e., (iii)), a∗ becomes zero.
Claim 6: If α has a positive value (α > 0), the optimal
effort level for the model with motivations and training is
higher than that in the benchmark model when a level of
burden δ equals zero.
This is the case where α > 0, ρ > 0, δ = 0 and γ = 0. Since
a∗ = α+ρ
2
, it is clear that a∗ > a‡.
Claim 7: If α and δ have positive values (i.e., Cases 2 to
5), the optimal effort level for the model with motivations and
training can only be higher than that in the benchmark model
when ρ or γ is sufficiently high.
Since the denominator of a∗ in each case is greater than that of
a‡ (i.e., 2(1 + δ)(1 + 2k(1 + δ)) > 2(1 + 2k)), the numerator
of a∗ should be sufficiently higher than that of a‡ to make
a∗ > a‡.
This claim implies that a moral hazard problem can be
mitigated if the employee’s level of emotional motivation or
forward transferability on his costly effort is sufficiently high.
Therefore, in our training example, even if a training program
results in a high burden on the employee, it can be very
effective in making the employee exert his due care as long
as the employee’s effort has higher forward transferability on
his costly effort.
D Interview Questions
Tables D and D provide the pro-forma for the questions
for the two days of interviews conducted with the stakeholders
from Table IV .
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Table V . Interview Questions for Round 1
REGULATION AIRPORT MANAGEMENT
(1) Which are the important security regulations that rule
the airport domain?
(a) Are these regulations applied to every airport,
irrespective of its size?
(b) Which is the authority in charge to design these
regulations?
(2) What do you think is the rationale for those
security measures? Setting goals, addressing incidents,
mandating technology, ecc
(3) When the regulator mandates security investments,
does he mandate specific measures OR just generic
measures? GENERAL REQUEST ↔ SPECIFIC RE-
QUEST
Specific: you must have at least 3 body scanner
Generic: spend to have less than 3 successful intrusions
to the tower
(4) If the regulation is violated, fines are applied? Can you
give some examples? Amount? Motivation?
(5) Do authorities prefer to charge security costs on
the airport overall budget OR on the passengers
flight ticket? COSTS TO BUDGET ↔ COSTS TO
PASSENGERS
(6) The national regulation you applied at Anadolu
airport envisages a minimum OR a mandatory set of
security measures? MINIMUM ↔ MANDATORY
Minimum: you have to do A or more depending on your
decision
Mandatory: you have to do exactly A.
(7) How does your airport address the regulation?
(a) Do you need (or want) to do something beyond the
mandatory rules? Why?
(b) What about other airports?
(1) If you had some money to invest in security, which
measure would be your first choice? And your second?
Can you motivate this choice?
(2) Think about a technological recent innovation the
regulator asked you to introduce: was it in line with the
needs of your airport? Did it really improve the overall
security?
(3) Do you think other security measures should be
requested and mandated by the regulator?
(4) If the regulator increased the minimum mandatory
level, would you prefer to invest more in training OR
in technological devices?
(5) If you had additional money to invest for the
security of your airport, would you prefer to employ
a new (or updated) technological device(s) OR to
introduce further training programs? TECHNOLOGY
↔ TRAINING
(6) If you had additional money to invest for the security
of your airport, would you prefer to hire additional
staff OR to introduce further training programs? MORE
STAFF ↔ TRAINING
(7) To prevent an attack, would you prefer to improve
technological countermeasures OR to (better) develop
a manual contingency procedure? TECHNOLOGY ↔
MANUAL.
(a) Would you do the same for a cyber-attack?
Note: Question sheet for semi-structured interviews. The interviews took place over the course of 14th and 15th
November 2013 at the premises of the Anadolu Airport. Interviews were conducted on a one-to-one basis while
a English translator attended in some cases. The interviews were recorded and transcribed. All interviewees
were asked to briefly introduce themselves and specify their roles.
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Table VI . Interview Questions for Round 2
AIRPORT MANAGER - TRAINING AIRPORT MANAGER - SECURITY
(1) Who is responsible for training in your airport?
(2) By whom is training provided in you airport? Is a
general or a specific training program? Who pays for
it?
(3) Do you have the chance to decide to whom commit the
delivery of training?
(a) If outsourcing: Why do you prefer this solution?
Criteria? (Cost efficient, qualified expert personnel,
better control, ...) Do you have a preferred provider?
(b) If insourcing: Why do you prefer this solution?
Criteria? If you could outsource, would you do that?
Why?
(4) The contractual relationship:
(a) How can you evaluate the quality of the out-
sourced/insourced provided training? Monitoring?
(Formal and direct monitoring// informal and infre-
quent? Why?)
(b) Is it a long term or short term contract?
(c) Do you share sensitive information with the out-
sourced company?
(5) Have you ever experienced conflicts with the out-
sourced company? Explain?
(6) Do you think that the training provided is enough? If
you had more money, would you improve training?
(1) Who is responsible for security in your airport?
(2) Can you describe the organizational structure of
the security staff in your airport? Which actors are
involved? Roles/duties? % decided by whom?
(3) Do you have the chance to decide to whom commit the
delivery of security services?
(a) If outsourcing: Why do you prefer this solution?
Criteria? (Cost efficient, qualified expert personnel,
better control, ...) Do you have a preferred provider?
(b) If insourcing: Why do you prefer this solution?
Criteria? If you could outsource, would you do that?
Why?
(4) The contractual relationship:
(a) How can you evaluate the quality of the out-
sourced/insourced provided training? Monitoring?
(Formal and direct monitoring// informal and infre-
quent? Why?)
(b) Is it a long term or short term contract?
(c) Do you share sensitive information with the out-
sourced company?
(5) Have you ever experienced conflicts with the out-
sourced company? Explain?
(6) Do you have an evaluation system for police staff as
well?
(7) Who pays for security in your airport? (state/charges
on passengers ticket/airport budget)
AIRPORT MANAGER PRIVATE SECURITY MANAGER(S)
(1) Do you think that the current regulation related to
airport security appropriately fits your airport needs?
Do you think that the regulation about security
measures is enough?
(2) Customized vs. uniform regulation: which is more
appropriate in your opinion? Why? Explain?
(3) When the regulator mandates security investments,
does he mandates specific measures or generic measures?
(you must have 3 X-ray scanners or just you must have
.. scanners?)
(4) Do you need to add additional security measures
beyond the mandatory rules?
(1) Which security role does your private security com-
pany cover in the airport? Duties? Activities? (Mention
at least 2)
(2) Do you share your everyday work activities with other
security agents? Do you have different roles/duties?
(How is the interplay with the other security agent
managed?)
(3) Do you have a specific training in aviation security?
(Different training programs for different security staff?
How many hours? Provided by whom?)
(4) Is your performance regularly monitored? Are secu-
rity agents in charge with different roles differently
evaluated? How? (Are they monitored on measurable
outcomes? (ex: security guards and X-ray inspector
should have different performance measures))
(5) About the contractual relationship:
(a) Is it a long term or short term contract?
(b) Does the airport share sensitive information with
you?
(6) Have you ever experienced conflicts with the airport
on the management of the security services? Explain.
Note: The interviews took place over the course of 27th and 28th of February 2014 at the premises of the
Anadolu Airport. Interviews were conducted on a one-to-one basis while a English translator attended in
some cases. The interviews were recorded and transcribed. All interviewees were asked to briefly introduce
themselves and specify their roles. The first row of questions aims at collecting data about the decision of
outsourcing/insourcing some services like training and security.
